

COUNTRY GERMANY		REPORT NO. E-56A-B-4801	(LEAVE BLANK) EP 141 883
AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT			
SUBJECT Socio-Psycho Information		(INTERVIEWER) BERG, Ralph (FN)	(EDITOR) MINTER
AREA REPORTED ON SEE CONTENTS BELOW		FROM (Agency) 7050 AISW (USAFE)	
DATE OF REPORT 28 Apr 54	DATE OF INFORMATION Jun 45 - Sep 53		EVALUATION C-3
PREPARED BY (Officer) HALBERT H. ACKER, Lt Col, USAF		SOURCE 272150	
REFERENCES (Control number, directive, previous report, etc., as applicable) HICOG (Ref 272150-E-56A-B-4802)			
SUMMARY: (Enter concise summary of report. Give significance in final one-sentence paragraph. List inclosures at lower left. Begin text of report on AF Form 112-Part II.)			
A. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:			
1. S was born on 12 Oct 1926 at LEVERKUSEN (5102N0659E), highschool graduate, by profession: chemical technician, good command of the Russian language.			
2. S was interned in several PW camps in STALINOGORSK (5404N3815E) from Jun 45 to Jun 48, where he worked in various coal mines. From Jun 48 to Jun 49 S was interned in a forced labor camp in KARAGANDA (4952N7310E) where he worked with Russian nationals in coal mines. From Jun 49 to May 50 S worked as an assistant truck driver in the PEVEKE (6942N17017E) area while interned with twenty four (24) German PWs in a civil convict camp. En route to and from this area S was detained for short periods of time in IRKUTSK (5217N10418E) and NOVOSIBIRSK (5502N8256E) forced labor camp. From May 50 to Sep 53 S was interned in PW camp # 6118-0 in SVERDLOVSK (5650N6038E), where he worked as a brigadier at the constr of various constr projects. During this period S was in close contact with Russian engineers and also Russian laborers. S was sentenced to seven (7) years of hard labor.			
3. S was cooperative throughout the interview. It is the opinion of the interviewer that S gave unbiased info which is regarded by the interviewer as reliable.			
B. SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS GENERAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS:			
4. While interned in various forced labor camps S came in contact with Techens (S's spelling Tetschen), who were deported from the CAUCASUS, and who were very opposed to the Soviet regime. The Soviet government regarded these nationals as unreliable to such an extent, that the Techens were not required to serve in the Soviet Army. S stated that the majority of these nationals spoke no Russian. Another group particularly opposed to the Soviet regime were former Russian soldiers who had been captured by the German Army, and were subsequently sentenced to long terms of forced labor for their surrender. Soldiers in active service, and also demobilized soldiers who had lived for any length of time in countries occupied by the Soviets, were also opposed to the Soviet regime, the reason for the latters discontent were the considerably lower living conditions in the USSR as compared with the western countries. A third, and possibly largest group of persons opposed to the Soviet regime were the workers on the collective farms, who were the lowest paid workers in the USSR.			
6. Major sources of discontent among the workers were the steadily rising work norms, the low purchasing power of the money earned, and compulsory state loans. Besides, all citizens lived under the permanent threat of arrest and deportation to areas of banishment.			
_____ INCL5.			
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR			
1 USAF (master) 1 497 RT3			
1 USAREUR ATIC			
1 DAD 1 BIO (G)			
1 USAFE 1 HICOG			

NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U. S. C.—31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY OTHER THAN UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AGENCIES, EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, USAF.

CONFIDENTIAL

(CLASSIFICATION)

Air Force—USAFE, Wsbn, Ger-123-5752

(CLASSIFICATION)

AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

FROM (Agency)	REPORT NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGES
7050 AISW (USAFE)	E-56A-B-4801-	2	3	3

C. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF STALIN:

7. The overwhelming majority of Russian workers who had confided in S held STALIN responsible for the spying system, which had brought hardship upon the Russian people. Also the promises made during World War II, according to which the living standard would be raised right after the war were not kept. Furthermore, STALIN was held responsible for the anti-religious campaign which was started following the end of the war. In contrast to criticism voiced against STALIN, S never heard disapproving remarks about LENIN.

8. At the announcement of STALIN's death S saw numerous Russian citizens who worked in the same detail weep. However, somewhat later the same persons expressed satisfaction and stated that they had faked mourning for fear of possible reprisals when showing their true state of mind. S was of the opinion that this attitude was typical for the Russian workers.

9. The amnesty act of Mar 27, 1953 was widely discussed among the PWs. It was rumored among PWs that a total of 4,000,000 persons were pardoned. It was the consensus of opinion among PWs that no PWs sentenced for political crimes, and those suspected of having committed so-called "grave crimes", such as the firing of villages and fighting Russian partisans, were released. Likewise, any persons who had been associated with prominent personalities, such as the butler of HITLER, LINGE, and HITLER's pilot, Flugkapitain BAUER, were not released. It was believed among the PWs that the amnesty was fully applied to elderly people, men over 60, and women over fifty five (55) years of age. S did not know if political prisoners were released. The population regarded the amnesty act as an intended measure to win the sympathies of the people, and to give MALENKOV a good start.

10. A reform of the criminal code was enforced according to the government announcements. Petty thefts (1 package of cigarettes) formerly punished with fifteen (15) years imprisonment, were now punished with one (1) year terms. On the other hand, acts of sabotage, high treason and espionage were punishable with death sentences. S stated that these changes were announced over the radio.

11. S found that the population was pleased with the price reduction carried out on Apr 1, 1953, which amounted to a cut of ten percent (10%). S was of the opinion that the Russian workers will appreciate any measure improving their economic conditions.

12. The Russian working class regarded the arrest and subsequent release of the Kremlin Doctors as a measure to discredit BERIA. It was S's opinion, that the average Russian citizen is not interested and has no means to obtain info of political events in the Kremlin. Consequently, happenings of this kind are not widely discussed.

14. Regarding BERIA's arrest, S heard the opinion voiced, that MALENKOV was responsible for the move. There were no indications of an earlier arrest than officially announced.

17. In the opinion of the S the real power in the USSR is vested with the MVD.

18. The Soviet population is of the opinion that living conditions will improve. The public is not clever enough to see through the propaganda and S believed that it is successfully dumbfounding the people.

D. PURGES, RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES AND MASS ARRESTS:

19. S met a medical professor who had belonged to the medical staff of STALIN till 1942. The professor (S could not remember his name) spoke German fluently, and had a good knowledge of the English language. He told S that on one occasion seven (7) persons representing the dictator, and who he was unable to distinguish were examined by him. S did not learn the reason for the banishment of the physician.

20. Beginning in 1950 all the people found guilty of espionage were sentenced to death. Therefore, S had no opportunity to meet them.

21. Following BERIA's arrest, civilians rumored about partisan activities in the Ukrainian SSR. S could not learn any details regarding the scope of the

NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U. S. C.—31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY OTHER THAN UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AGENCIES, EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, USAF.

CONFIDENTIAL
(CLASSIFICATION)

AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

FROM (Agency)	REPORT NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGES
7050 AISW (USAF)	E-56A-B-4801	3	3	

revolts.

22. S estimated the number of Lithuanians and Estonians in SVERDLOVSK at 600. The majority were young men, seventeen (17) to twenty (20) years old, and were housed in military barracks. S made this observation in 1953.

E. FORCED LABOR CAMPS:

23. About forty (40) forced labor camps were located in the KARAGANDA area. Every camp housed from 800 to 1,000 inmates representing twenty two (22) nationalities. However, the majority of the convicts, who worked in the different coal mines, were Russian nationals. S did not hear of any de-activation plans when he left this town in Jun 1949. When transferred from PEVEKE to SVERDLOVSK S was interned for a short period in a KARABASH (5528N6012E) transient labor camp. Due to the nature of these camps, the number of inmates ranged from 10,000 to 70,000 civil convicts, who were accommodated in eighty (80) large barracks, or were camping in the open during the warm season. The area was guarded by one (1) infantry regiment. En route from KARAGANDA to PEVEKE S was interned for several days in a NOVOSIBIRSK forced labor camp, which accommodated about 2,000 internees.

24. While interned in KARAGANDA civil convict camp, and working in the coal mine # 19 B I S, S met at the beginning of 1949 a US pilot by the Christian name Johny (surname unknown, but S thought it sounded like a German name). Johny was twenty five (25) years old, 180 cm tall, blond hair, slim build, of cheerful disposition. Johny stated that he mistakingly landed his two (2) engine military plane on Soviet occupied territory, and that he and three (3) or four (4) other members of the crew were arrested by the Soviets. Johny had tried to contact US authorities but had not succeeded. S could not recall the number of the camp, but stated that at that time there were thirty (30) Germans among the camp's total 1,300 inmates.

25. Beginning in 1940 so-called "Sashtenaya Knizhka" (English Translation: book of computation) were introduced in the PEVEKE forced labor camps. All work exceeding 100% of the norm was entered, and the terms were shortened as indicated below:

for 110% internee was credited with one (1) extra day, for 130% internee was credited with two (2) extra days, for 150% internee was credited with three (3) extra days.

However S was of the opinion that this privilege was extended to convicts held in desolated areas, and who worked under difficult labor conditions.

26. In Aug 1949 several thousand forced laborers were transported on the 10,000 ton vessel "SUTSHA" from BUKHTA VANINA (coordinates unknown) to PEVEKE. About thirty (30) prisoners planned to take over the ship, and steer it to a US harbor. The mutiny was disclosed by three (3) internees, and the conspirators were shot on board the ship near the port of NIKOLAYEVSK (5308N14044E).

APPROVED:

W. A. Mackenzie, Capt
for
D. M. ALLISON
Colonel, United States Air Force
Commander

J. W. Stiff, Capt
for
HALBERT H. AOKER
Lt Col, USAF
Commander
7056 AISS

NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U. S. C.—31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY OTHER THAN UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AGENCIES, EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE USAF.

CONFIDENTIAL

(CLASSIFICATION)

Air Force—USAF, Waba, Ger-34-1681